Relational work: at the intersection of cognition, interaction and emotion by Locher, Miriam A. & Langlotz, Andreas
 Bulletin suisse de linguistique appliquée © 2008 Centre de linguistique appliquée 
N° 88, 2008, 165-191 • ISSN 1023-2044 Université de Neuchâtel 
Relational work: at the intersection of 
cognition, interaction and emotion 
Miriam A. LOCHER 
Andreas LANGLOTZ 
Universität Basel, Englisches Seminar, 
Nadelberg 6, CH-4051 Basel 
miriam.locher@unibas.ch, andreas.langlotz@unibas.ch 
Dieser Ausatz diskutiert die Verbindung zwischen der Höflichkeits- bzw. Unhöflichkeitsforschung und 
Studien, welche Emotionen untersuchen, wie sie in interpersoneller Kommunikation auftreten. Wir 
schlagen vor, dass der kognitive Begriff des 'frames', d.h. die mentale Repräsentation von 
Erfahrungswissen, als Orientierungsrahmen für soziale Normen und Erwartungen dient. Dieses 
Normwissen spielt eine Rolle, wenn GesprächsteilnehmerInnen die Angemessenheit von 
Beziehungsarbeit ('relational work') bewerten. In diesem Prozess werden auch Emotionen evoziert, 
welche ihrerseits eine wichtige Funktion in diesem Entscheidungsprozess einnehmen. Es braucht 
jedoch noch mehr Forschung, um zu eruieren, wie und zu welchem Grad emotionale Reaktionen die 
Bewertungen der Beziehungsarbeit unterstützen. 
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1. Introduction 
In this paper on relational work1, a programmatic framework is proposed which 
sketches an integration of cognitive, discourse analytical and emotional 
notions to discuss interpersonal dimensions of human interaction. Cognitive 
pillars such as the notion of "frame" and issues of politeness and impoliteness 
always involve an individual in a particular social activity, who judges relational 
work according to the norms of this practice. It is recognized that this social 
being has emotions and that these may influence or in fact be part and parcel 
of such judgments. We therefore aim to delineate the possibilities of 
connecting cognition, interaction and emotion for a relational work framework 
in an exploratory manner. We are well aware that we will only be able to touch 
the tip of the iceberg on research on emotions, but hope to show that 
im/politeness research would benefit from learning more about emotions, 
since only a small number of politeness researchers have explicitly explored 
this issue so far (most notably Spencer-Oatey, 2005, 2007). In section 2 of this 
paper we will briefly address past and current politeness research. In section 
3, we will outline how emotions and the recognition of intentions intertwine 
with relational work. In section 4 we will discuss examples of naturally 
                     
1  Our thanks go to Brook Bolander for her careful reading and critical comments. 
Published in Bulletin Suisse de Linguistique Appliquée (VALS-ASLA) (Swiss association of applied linguistics) 88, 165-191, 2008
which should be used for any reference to this work
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occurring linguistic data in order to illustrate the surfacing of emotions as 
caused by the breaking of frames. The focus of this discussion will be on how 
interactants negotiate these breaks in their endeavor to maintain or challenge 
their relationships. Finally, section 5 summarizes the main findings of this 
paper and formulates a number of questions for future research. 
2. Politeness and impoliteness research 
Politeness research has been in vogue ever since the seminal work of Lakoff 
(1973), Brown & Levinson (1978, 1987) and Leech (1983). This early work is 
still discussed today and has furthered our knowledge of how individuals 
negotiate the interpersonal aspect of language to a great extent. In the 
meantime, however, researchers have developed additional frameworks to 
address interpersonal language issues (e.g., Fraser, 1990; Kasper, 1990; 
Watts, 1989, 1992), and several monographs have tackled both the task of 
reviewing the existing literature and of adding to it (e.g. Eelen, 2001; Locher, 
2004; Mills, 2005; Watts, 2003). Not only can we speak of two general trends 
in research today – first order versus second order investigations –, we can 
also witness a move away from primarily focusing on the study of mitigation 
towards a broader understanding of facework, or relational work, in linguistics. 
This interest has sparked recent work on impoliteness and conflictual data 
(Bousfield, 2008a; Bousfield & Culpeper, 2008; Bousfield & Locher, 2008; 
Gorji, 2007).  
In politeness research, the distinction between first order and second order 
research goes back to Watts, Ide and Ehlich's (1992) introduction to the 
collection Politeness in Language, and it was highlighted in the early 2000s by 
Eelen (2001). At the moment, the beginning of texts usually see politeness 
researchers identify whether they wish to discuss theoretical, that is etic, 
second order concepts, or whether they intend to pursue investigations of an 
emic, or first order nature that studies the understanding of lay people. In 
section 2.1 second order approaches are touched on, while section 2.2 is 
reserved for first order approaches. In section 2.3 we will briefly address the 
most recent findings in impoliteness research. 
2.1 Traditional approaches to politeness research 
The works of Lakoff (1973), Brown & Levinson (1978, 1987) and Leech (1983) 
are among the most discussed approaches to politeness. It is impossible to 
give these frameworks justice in such a brief review. In what follows those key 
issues specifically needed for the discussion of emotions and relational work 
are addressed. 
Fraser (1990) argues that both Lakoff (1973) and Leech (1983) work within a 
conversational maxim approach. Both researchers list rules or maxims and 
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claim that interactants orient their linguistic behavior accordingly. Lakoff's rules 
of politeness are 'don't impose', 'give options', and 'make A feel good, be 
friendly'. Leech (1983) postulates that a Politeness Principle works in 
conjunction with the Cooperative Principle (Grice, 1975). In fact, he claims that 
the Politeness Principle is at the heart of people's frequent non-adherence to 
the Cooperative Principle (1980: 80) and that the aim of the Politeness 
Principle is "to maintain the social equilibrium and the friendly relations which 
enable us to assume that our interlocutors are being cooperative in the first 
place" (Leech, 1983: 82). The Politeness Principle consists of the following 
maxims (Leech, 1983: 132): 
(I) TACT MAXIM (in impositives and commissives) 
 (a) Minimize cost to other  
 [(b)  Maximize benefit to other] 
(II) GENEROSITY MAXIM (in impositives and commissives) 
 (a) Minimize benefit to self  
 [(b) Maximize cost to self] 
(III) APPROBATION MAXIM (in expressives and assertives) 
 (a) Minimize dispraise of other  
 [(b) Maximize praise of other] 
(IV) MODESTY MAXIM (in expressives and assertives) 
 (a) Minimize praise of self  
 [(b) Maximize dispraise of self] 
(V) AGREEMENT MAXIM (in assertives) 
 (a) Minimize disagreement between self and other  
 [(b) Maximize agreement between self and other] 
(VI) SYMPATHY MAXIM (in assertives) 
 (a) Minimize antipathy between self and other  
 [(b) Maximize sympathy between self and other] (Leech, 1983: 132) 
Leech maintains that not all the maxims have equal weight. He considers the 
Tact Maxim and the Approbation Maxim as stronger than the Generosity and 
Modesty Maxims, since politeness is argued to be generally more oriented 
towards the other than the self. Overall, he claims that the interactants give 
"avoidance of discord" more importance than "seeking concord" (Leech, 1983: 
133).  
In Lakoff's (1973) and Leech's (1983) approaches we see rules or maxims 
written down which are claimed to guide interactants in their linguistic output. 
The discursive approach to politeness also postulates that norms play a role 
when we deal with politeness issues, as explained below. The difference is, 
however, that the discursive approach highlights that such norms are sensitive 
to different cultures and are, in fact, specific to practices that interactants 
engage in. They may thus differ quite considerably (for a more thorough 
discussion see Locher, 2004: 65-66). 
The most popular and productive politeness theory to date was proposed by 
Brown and Levinson in 1978 (republished in 1987). They center their 
understanding of politeness on the concepts of face, face-threatening act and 
mitigation. Brown & Levinson (1987: 61) base their definition of face on 
Goffman (1967) and describe face as "the public self-image that every 
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member wants to claim for himself [or herself]". They maintain that there are 
two sides to face:  
negative face: the want of every 'competent adult member' that his actions be unimpeded 
by others. 
positive face: the want of every member that his wants be desirable to at least some 
others. (Brown & Levinson, 1987: 62) 
Scollon & Scollon (2001: 48) have named these two sides the independence 
and involvement aspects of face. Brown & Levinson's argument is that "face 
respect is not an unequivocal right" (1987: 62), but that it is in the interactants' 
interest to "maintain each other's face" (1987: 60). Since people cannot avoid 
having to commit acts that are face-threatening (i.e. face-threatening acts, or 
FTAs), Brown & Levinson argue that they work along the following rationale: 
Unless [the speaker]'s want to do an FTA with maximum efficiency […] is greater than 
[the speaker]'s want to preserve [the hearer]'s (or [the speaker]'s) face to any degree, 
then [the speaker] will want to minimize the face threat of the FTA. (Brown & Levinson, 
1987: 62) 
This argumentation results in a focus on mitigation in the sense that politeness 
is claimed to play a role once interactants consider each other's face and 
choose the relevant strategy to hedge the force of a face-threatening act. 
Brown & Levinson (1987: 60) list two main strategies ("do the FTA", "don't do 
the FTA") and distinguish between off record and on record ("without 
redressive action, baldly"; "with redressive action, positive politeness"; "with 
redressive action, negative politeness") strategies (see Fig. 1). 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1: Possible strategies for realizing FTAs (Brown & Levinson, 1987: 60) 
The choice of strategy is adjusted according to the balancing of three factors: 
the value of the distance (D) between the speaker (S) and the hearer (H), the 
measure of the power that the hearer has over the speaker (P), and the 
relative ranking of the imposition in its cultural and situational context (Rx). 
Brown and Levinson (1987: 76) work these factors into the following equation 
for the weightiness (W) of the face-threatening act 'x': Wx = D (S,H) + P (H,S) 
+ Rx. This presents an abstract way of accounting for the intricate social 
factors that play a role in interaction. 
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Brown and Levinson's work has been criticized for several reasons. For 
example, the ranking of strategies, i.e. that indirect utterances are more polite 
than direct ones, has been found to be an over-generalization. In fact, many 
researchers would stress today that no linguistic utterance is polite or impolite 
per se2. In addition, Brown and Levinson clearly describe manifestations of 
facework, that is the linguistic manifestation of paying attention to face, but do 
they also describe politeness as such? Whether or not to answer this question 
positively or negatively depends on your theoretical standpoint, as we will 
discuss in the next section3.  
2.2 The discursive approach to politeness research 
Lakoff (1973), Brown & Levinson (1978/1987) and Leech (1983) can be 
described as second order, theoretical researchers, aiming at a universal 
understanding of politeness phenomena. This is not to say that they did not 
work with naturally occurring data. On the contrary, they worked with such 
data in order to develop a theoretical understanding of the observed linguistic 
patterns. There is, of course, nothing to say against such an approach. The 
objection by first order researchers such as, for example, expressed in Locher 
(2006), is therefore not directed at developing theories as such, but it is one 
that takes issue with the name of the theory. For example, Brown and 
Levinson's theory of politeness has been treated in such a way that every 
linguistic manifestation that cannot be explained with the above-mentioned 
strategies is considered impolite. In other words, politeness and impoliteness, 
in their theoretical understanding, cover the entire spectrum of facework. 
The discursive approach to politeness claims that there is not only face-saving 
behavior to be studied, but also manifestations of face-enhancing, face-
maintaining, or face-aggravating (i.e., face-attacking; cf. Tracy, 2008) 
behavior. In Locher & Watts (2008), we maintain that 
Relational work refers to all aspects of the work invested by individuals in the 
construction, maintenance, reproduction and transformation of interpersonal relationships 
among those engaged in social practice. (Locher & Watts, 2008: 96) 
First order researchers argue that the term politeness is used by interactants 
for a much smaller slice of the relational work pie, as assumed in second order 
research (Locher & Watts, 2005, 2008). As soon as the term is removed from 
its status as labeling a theory, it returns to the realm of judgments by lay 
people, and is part of a whole series of terms that describe how people deem 
                     
2  This is a point that was already made early on in politeness research (see e.g. Fraser & Nolen, 
1981: 96). 
3  Suffice it to say that Brown and Levinson's strategies can be used to describe facework more 
generally. For further criticism of this theory see Eelen (2001), Watts (2003) and Locher (2004, 
2006). 
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other people's relational work, such as rude, offensive, uncouth, polite, 
polished, refined, etc. This view is fully compatible with participant-oriented 
ethnomethodological approaches to studying the praxeology of negotiating 
norms (cf. Garfinkel, 1967). 
This approach is described as 'discursive' for two reasons. First, the meanings 
of the first order terms change over time. For example, the connotations of 
what constitutes 'politeness' in the 18th century differ from the 21st century 
dictionary definitions (cf. Locher, 2008). Second, even today, interactants of 
different practices have different ideas of what exactly constitutes, for 
example, polite, rude or impolite behavior. This is the case both with respect to 
the different connotations of these terms, as well as the different linguistic 
behavior associated with the terms. For example, Mills (2002, 2005) reports 
that the term 'politeness' may carry negative connotations for some groups of 
people, while others value the term. As a consequence, we need to study the 
practices4 in which interactants engage in order to find the norms of behavior 
that trigger the judgments.  
Here we can make the link between practices and the cognitive concept of 
'frame'. In Tannen's (1993: 53) words, frames are "structures of expectation 
based on past experience" – classic examples being how to behave in a 
restaurant or in a service encounter5. In other words, interactants will not make 
judgments on relational work in a social vacuum, but in relation to their past 
personal experiences or expectations about norms as well as rights and 
obligations pertaining to their person. In a process of analogy, interactants will 
even approach situations that they have never been in before with 
expectations about such rights and obligations. Such frames are acquired in a 
process of socialization during a person's life. 
The discursive, first order approach to politeness and impoliteness is of course 
not the first attempt at describing relational work that highlights the importance 
of norms and expectations. As mentioned before, Lakoff (1973) and Leech 
(1983) base their understanding of politeness on pragmatic rules or principles. 
Brown & Levinson (1978, 1987) can also be argued to account for norms 
when we consider the estimation of the weightiness of the face-threatening act 
'x', which is, among other factors, based on the relative ranking of the 
imposition. In contrast to the discursive approach, they speak of such norms 
on a much more global or even universal level, rather than on a practice-
based level. However, Fraser (1990: 233) proposed to speak of a 
conversational contract that participants enter when engaging in interaction. 
                     
4  For this purpose, the notion of Community of Practice as used by Eckert and McConnell-Ginet 
(1992) in their research in sociolinguistics is helpful.  
5  For earlier approaches, see Bateson (1954) and Goffman (1974, 1981) and consult, for 
example, Escandell-Vidal (1996) or Tannen (1993) for an overview of different terminology. 
Miriam A. LOCHER & Andreas LANGLOTZ 171 
 
He maintains that there are sets of rights and obligations, one of which is 
"imposed by the social institutions applicable to the interaction" (Fraser, 
1990: 232)6. In fact, much of the recent work on politeness and impoliteness 
recognizes the importance of practice-based norms (cf. e.g. Bousfield & 
Locher, 2008). There thus seems to be a trend towards recognizing variation 
in relational work, while the differences in approach with respect to first order 
and second order investigations remains to a certain extent. 
2.3 Impoliteness research 
It is only in the last couple of years that research interest has moved beyond 
the study of mitigation within relational work, and has turned to conflictual 
data. The study of impoliteness phenomena, however, is still somewhat 
neglected in linguistics. Early research was heavily influenced by Brown and 
Levinson's framework. Lachenicht (1980), Culpeper (1996), Kienpointner 
(1997), and Culpeper, Bousfield and Wichmann (2003) all attempted to work 
out analogous strategies of impolite relational work to the ones proposed for 
polite behavior by Brown and Levinson. Culpeper, Bousfield and Wichmann 
(2003), for example, speak of five 'super-strategies' (bald on record 
impoliteness; positive impoliteness; negative impoliteness; off-record 
impoliteness; withhold politeness). Bousfield (2008b) later reduces these 
strategies to only two – on-record impoliteness and off-record impoliteness. 
First order researchers such as Hutchby (2008) and Tracy (2008) highlight the 
need to study situated, 'grounded' practices to observe what might be deemed 
impoliteness. Today, we can thus see both first order and second order 
researchers tackling face-aggravating or face-attacking behavior, as 
evidenced in the edited collections Rude Britannia (Gorji, 2007) and 
Impoliteness in Language (Bousfield & Locher, 2008), the special issue of the 
Journal of Politeness Research (Bousfield & Culpeper, 2008) or the 
monograph Impoliteness in Interaction (Bousfield, 2008a). Bousfield & 
Culpeper (2008: 163) maintain that, while there is a rapprochement of the first 
and second order approaches (Locher & Bousfield, 2008: 7), there is still 
considerable disagreement about the basics. They list the following issues in 
need of clarification (Bousfield & Culpeper, 2008: 163): 
1. How to label the phenomenon under scrutiny 
2. The ontological status of impoliteness and the implications of this 
3. The role of intention 
                     
6  Fraser (1990: 232) speaks of three sets of rights and obligations: a conventional and seldom 
negotiated set (e.g. the rules of turn-taking); one that is "imposed by the social institutions 
applicable to the interaction", and which is also seldom negotiated; and the third is "determined 
by previous encounters or the particulars of the situation" and is hence variable. (cf. Locher, 
2004: 70-72) 
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4. How to analyze the language and contexts that constitute impoliteness 
In what follows, we will highlight the problem of intention and will add 
considerations about the role of an affective stance or emotions towards 
relational work. 
3.  Relational work, intentions and emotions 
With respect to assigning intentions to interactants in relation to their linguistic 
output, we are faced with first order and second order distinctions once more. 
Brown and Levinson (1987: 58), for example, speak of a 'model person', who 
acts rationally and thinks strategically about his or her language choices. In 
the same way, it is argued that addressees recognize linguistic output as 
having been motivated by such rational and strategic considerations. Once we 
move to judgments on relational work in a discursive framework, however, 
assigning intentions appears to become less straightforward. In fact, even 
researchers who favor a second order approach, struggle in their attempt to 
establish to what extent and in what ways intentions play a role in the study of 
impoliteness and rudeness. Bousfield (2008b: 132) takes "impoliteness as 
constituting the issuing of intentionally gratuitous and conflictive face-
threatening acts (FTAs) that are purposefully performed" (emphasis added). 
Culpeper (2008: 36) also assigns importance to intentions in his definition of 
impoliteness: "Impoliteness, as I would define it, involves communicative 
behaviour intending to cause the 'face loss' of a target or perceived by the 
target to be so" (emphasis added). In contrast, Terkourafi (2008: 70) 
hypothesizes that the recognition of intentions by addressees is linked to 
rudeness rather than to impoliteness:  
▪ marked rudeness or rudeness proper occurs when the expression used is not 
conventionalised relative to the context of occurrence; following recognition of the 
speaker's face-threatening intention by the hearer, marked rudeness threatens the 
addressee's face (and, through that, the speaker's face in the addressee's eyes – 
although it may also constitute it in the eyes of another participant, including the speaker 
him/herself); when over-politeness leads to rudeness proper it threatens the speaker's 
face; 
▪ impoliteness occurs when the expression used is not conventionalised relative to the 
context of occurrence; it threatens the addressee's face (and, through that, the speaker's 
face) but no face-threatening intention is attributed to the speaker by the hearer. 
(Terkourafi, 2008: 70, emphasis added) 
These definitions differ from the approach by Brown and Levinson in that the 
researchers claim that it matters whether the interpreters of an utterance 
assign intentionality to the speakers in order to arrive at a relational work 
judgment such as 'rudeness' or 'impoliteness', rather than arguing that 
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interactants always act intentionally per se7. This thus constitutes a move 
towards a first order understanding of terms such as 'impoliteness' or 
'rudeness'.  
In Locher & Watts (2008), we stress Lachenicht's (1980: 619-620) argument 
that "[i]f the purpose of aggravation is to hurt, then means must be chosen that 
will hurt" (emphasis in original). In other words, interactants must be aware of 
the relative norms of a particular practice in order to adjust the relational work 
accordingly. However, we also mention that  
[a] speaker may wish to be aggressive and hurtful, but still not come across as such to 
the hearer. Alternatively, a hearer may interpret the speaker's utterance as negatively 
marked with respect to appropriate behaviour, while the speaker did not intentionally wish 
to appear as such. In a first order approach to impoliteness, it is the interactants' 
perceptions of communicators' intentions rather than the intentions themselves that 
determine whether a communicative act is taken to be impolite or not. (Locher & Watts, 
2008: 80) 
We thus stress the interactive quality of communication and its unfolding 
dynamics. The jury is still out on the role of intentions both with respect to its 
theoretical status in relational work theories as such and its connection to 
particular lexical items – in other words, whether 'rudeness' or 'impoliteness' 
indeed differ with respect to whether or not people assign intentions to the 
speakers, as posited by Bousfield, Culpeper and Terkourafi quoted above8. 
What we are left with then is, as Hutchby (2008: 238) argues, the possibility to 
focus on ''occasions when participants themselves display an orientation to 
actions as impolite". We can thus, for example, focus on the meta-comments 
in which interactants refer to relational work that did not meet the norms of 
appropriateness of a particular practice (see section 4). 
The final theoretical issue that shall be tackled in this paper is the role of 
emotions in the creation and interpretation of relational work. Brown and 
Levinson do not give emotions much room in their framework, but they 
mention 'affect' or 'liking' in their preface to the 1987 edition (p. 16) and call for 
further research on its connection to the distance variable. They also claim 
that explicit "expressions of strong (negative) emotions towards H – e.g. 
hatred, anger, lust (S indicated possible motivation for harming H or H's 
goods)" or "expressions of violent (out-of-control) emotions (S gives H 
possible reason to fear him or be embarrassed by him)" are intrinsic face-
threatening acts (Brown & Levinson, 1987: 66). Indeed many of the acts that 
                     
7  Brown and Levinson's framework is generally more sender / speaker than addressee / 
interpreter oriented (cf. e.g. Schulze, 1985; Werkhofer, 1992). 
8  In fact, some people do not seem to make a difference between the lexemes 'rude' and 
'impolite', as evidenced in the not to be neglected number of instances on the Web where they 
are used interchangeably or even in combination: 'rude and impolite' (cf. Locher, under review). 
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they list are at least emotionally charged, such as disapproval, challenges, 
criticism, contempt, ridicule, irreverence, but also compliments, or praise, etc.  
While some researchers such as Culpeper (2007) and Kienpointner9 (2008) 
have mentioned the importance of emotions, Spencer-Oatey (2005) seems to 
be the politeness researcher who stresses emotions most in her framework of 
rapport management as she explicitly links the linguistic considerations to a 
psychological background. In order to show how she does this, her framework 
will be very briefly introduced.  
Spencer-Oatey (2005) argues that  
[r]apport refers to the relative harmony and smoothness of relations between people, and 
rapport management refers to the management (or mismanagement) of relations 
between people. (Spencer-Oatey, 2005: 96; author's emphasis) 
Rapport management is thus closely related to relational work, and we would 
posit that the terms can be used interchangeably10 (cf. Locher, 2008 for a 
comparison). Both terms refer to behavior that is not only face-enhancing, but 
can also be face-maintaining, or face-damaging (cf. Spencer-Oatey, 2005: 
96). Like the discursive approach to relational work, Spencer-Oatey is also 
interested in perceptions and judgments by interactants on relational work. 
She argues that there are three key elements at the basis of such judgments: 
"behavioural expectations, face sensitivities and interactional wants" 
(Spencer-Oatey, 2005: 96). The behavioral expectations can be linked to the 
notion of frame previously discussed and stem from the interactants' beliefs 
about "what is prescribed, what is permitted and what is proscribed" in a 
particular social practice (2005: 97). 'Interactional wants' refer to the local 
goals that emerge in interaction and that are negotiated on the spot, while 
'face sensitivities' can be related to the rights and obligations that a person 
expects to be granted/given in a particular practice.  
With respect to this latter complex, we should not see face as static, but as 
emerging in interaction (cf. Goffman's notion of face, as discussed in Locher, 
2008). In this way, the concept of face can be linked to identity – a notion that 
is in turn understood as dynamic and constructed rather then pre-determined 
(Bucholtz & Hall, 2005), since we can speak of many different faces that 
interactants negotiate in interaction. What we find, then, is an intricate 
interweaving of social dynamics: people judge relational work with respect to 
social norms, including expectations about rights and obligations that are 
                     
9  Kienpointener (2008: 246) argues that "apart from factors such as power, distance and rank of 
imposition, the emotional relationship between the interlocutors, too, plays a decisive role, 
influencing the cooperative or competitive climate of the ongoing interaction. This has rightly 
been stressed by Watts (2003: 96-97)". 
10  Spencer-Oatey (2007: 647) has a different view on this.  
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claimed by individuals in particular practices. The final step in this reasoning is 
to claim that it matters to people on an emotional level whether their attempts 
at identity construction are approved of or not. Spencer-Oatey succinctly 
(2007) describes this connection between face and emotions as follows: 
[F]ace is associated with affective sensitivity. Goffman (1967), Brown & Levinson 
(1978/1987) and many other face theorists all agree that face is a vulnerable 
phenomenon, and hence associated with emotional reactions. Goffman (1967: 6) 
explains it as follows: ''If the encounter sustains an image of him that he has long taken 
for granted, he probably will have few feelings about the matter. If events establish a face 
for him that is better than he might have expected, he is likely to 'feel good'; if his ordinary 
expectations are not fulfilled, one expects that he will 'feel bad' or 'feel hurt'. (Spencer-
Oatey, 2007: 644) 
Such considerations are at the heart of comments made on the markedness of 
relational work. In Locher and Watts (2005) a line of argumentation is pursued, 
originally initiated by Watts (e.g., 1989, 1992), which claims that people judge 
social behavior positively, negatively or neutrally with respect to 
appropriateness. It was then claimed that positively marked relational work 
could be interpreted as, for example, 'polite' (face-enhancing), while negatively 
marked relational work might be labeled 'impolite' (face-challenging or face-
damaging). This argument is in line with research on emotions in the field of 
Discursive Psychology (for a concise overview see Edwards, 2005). For 
instance, Edwards (1997) claims that 
Emotion discourse is an integral feature of talk about events, mental states, mind and 
body, personal dispositions, and social relations. […] Emotion categories are used in 
assigning causes and motives to actions, in blamings, excuses, and accounts. (Edwards, 
1997: 170)  
In Locher & Watts (2005) it was also argued that there is relational work that is 
appropriate to a particular practice but not marked as such (face-maintaining, 
politic). These values are indeed to be understood with emotional reactions in 
mind, as outlined in Spencer-Oatey's description quoted above. Examples of 
such emotional reactions can be listed as follows: 
Emotional reactions (own and other)  
Joy contentment/pleasure 
 pride 
Surprise surprise/amazement 
Anger irritation/annoyance 
 frustration 
 disgust/disapproval  
Sadness disappointment/displeasure 
 shame/guilt 
 embarrassment/insult/humilitation 
(from "Fig. 3. The Base of Dynamic Perceptions of Rapport", (Spencer-Oatey, 2005: 
116)) 
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From Damasio's (1994, 1999, 2004) neuropsychological perspective, 
emotional reactions must be seen as: 
[…] bioregulatory reactions that aim at promoting, directly or indirectly, the sort of 
physiological states that secure not just survival but survival regulated into the range that 
we, conscious and thinking creatures, identify with well-being. (Damasio, 2004: 50) 
Thus emotions are internally represented value categories that can be 
perceived subjectively and expressed to interactants. Having a primarily 
evaluative function, emotional categories allow human beings to define their 
subjective relationship to their world of experience including their social 
environments. In line with Schwarz-Friesel (2007: 67), emotions help us (1) to 
position ourselves to other people, objects, states, and events (e.g., love, 
hate, envy, jealousy, sympathy, empathy), (2) to evaluate our proprioceptively 
perceived selves (e.g., shame, regret, pride), (3) to react to situational factors 
(e.g., happiness, anger, mourning), and (4) to determine our orientation 
towards and our engagement with our world (e.g., fear, panic, lust). All of 
these dimensions also play a quintessential role with regard to relational work: 
the display of emotional states allows the interactants to signal their evaluation 
of both the transactional state of the shared practice as well as the ongoing 
linguistic negotiation of their social relationship. Thus, since the concept of 
'face' is directly linked to an evaluative classification, the (linguistic) 
expression, description and negation of face needs through relational work 
strategies must be tightly coupled with emotional display. Thus, face-
enhancing strategies or face-challenging / damaging FTAs must be coupled 
with (the expression of) emotions that support the feeling of being accepted or 
not (e.g., love, hate, happiness, shame, pride), while face-challenging and 
face-damaging expressions are very likely to be associated with emotions that 
evaluate one's engagement with the world as being thwarted (e.g. anger, 
envy, jealousy). Accordingly, it is to be expected that first order judgments 
such as 'polite' or 'rude' can predominantly be linked to particular emotional 
reactions (other than merely stating that they are negative or positive), but this 
link still needs to be empirically explored. As a potential starting point, we see 
fruitful – but so far underexplored – links between relational work, impoliteness 
research in particular, and research on emotions in the field of conflict 
communication (e.g., Guerrero & La Valley, 2006; Jones, 2000). Alternative 
interdisciplinary research perspectives are pointed to by Metts & Planalp 
(2002): they see links between linguistics and philosophy, which also 
recognizes that emotions are a source of values (344), history, which 
investigates the changing ways of communicating emotions over time (344), 
and sociology, which places shame "at the crux of micro- and macroprocesses 
in social control and conformity" (345). 
In actual communication, emotions can be expressed on three levels: 
(1) perceptible bodily symptoms such as sweating, blushing, turning pale, 
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(2) non-verbal expressions such as facial expressions or gestures, and 
(3) verbally through intonation, interjections, emotion words, style differences, 
expressive speech acts, etc. (cf. Schwarz-Friesel, 2007, Ch. 5). From the 
perspective of first order research, these forms of emotional expression 
cannot be assumed to be universally and statically coupled with politeness 
judgments11. Rather these associations are in flux and bound to the concrete 
discursive environments in which they occur. Concrete emotional display and 
meta-comments on social and emotional behavior in actual discourse, e.g. 
conflict communication, allow us to connect emotional reactions with the 
socio-communicative contexts and practices in which they are embedded. 
Similar to this argument, Metts & Planalp (2002) posit that 
[e]motional meaning of messages is a flexible substance that is shaped and negotiated in 
the moment (the proximal context) and yet built from resources developed by the 
participants through their experiences, predispositions, and cultures (the distal context). 
(Metts & Planalp, 2002: 361) 
We can thus establish a link between the cognitive concept 'frame', 
established in practices, and the dynamic and interactive concepts of face and 
emotion. Indeed, the codification and expression of emotions is subject to 
cultural and social conventions and norms, which Ekman & Friesen (1975) 
and Ekman (1978) call display rules. Depending on socio-cultural context and 
practice, interactants are expected to intensify, deintensify, simulate, inhibit, or 
mask their emotions in order to behave according to the norms of appropriate 
relational behavior. With regard to frames, display rules are thus coupled with 
emotional expectations linked to specific parts of the frame. Thus the close 
association between display rules and expectations about appropriate 
relational work seems obvious. Culture-specific and practice-specific norms 
can become explicit in proverbs or sayings such as Boys don't cry! or they can 
be bound to more implicit norms; for instance, we expect familiar people to 
smile or be happy when they greet us or to show some level of regret when 
we are leaving. So to survive in orderly and face-maintaining or face-
enhancing social environments we rely on people to control their emotions 
according the expectations of the practice. Otherwise we would not have 
reason to ban hooligans from football stadiums because they do not conform 
to the acceptable intensity of emotional display and behavior.  
The association of display rules with frames and corresponding expectations 
of relational work makes it possible to take up again the notion of intention in 
                     
11  Research on emotions in the field of behavioral anthropology suggests a complex interaction of 
both universal and highly culture-specific determinants (for a recent overview see Ekman, 
2003). Ekman's studies show that facial expressions for basic emotions, including anger, fear, 
surprise, disgust, happiness, and sadness, are universally recognized by members of different 
cultures or even produced by congenitally blind people. However, Ekman (1978) also shows 
that the display of emotions is often subject to culture specific rules. 
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politeness research. Just as Lachenicht (1980: 619-620) points out that you 
have to know the norms of a practice to exploit them, display rules equally 
invite speakers to intentionally play with, expand or violate these rules 
strategically to create purpose-driven emotional effects that have a direct 
impact on the definition of the interactants' social relationship, including their 
context-specific definition of face and identity. For instance, flight attendants 
are trained to smile happily even in stressful situations to construct the image 
of extraordinarily friendly service. This is what Hochschild (1983) calls 
emotional labor. To interpret Hochschild's analysis from the perspective of 
politeness research, emotional labor thus consists in stretching display rules 
for the expression of happiness and sympathy in the context of service 
practices. The intention of this exaggerated display of happiness is to create 
face-enhancing effects with the customers.  
In short, while a discussion of 'emotion' has so far not had center stage in 
politeness research12, we can nevertheless establish quite an obvious 
connection between the two by linking the notion of face and identity 
construction with judgments on a person's rights and obligations in a particular 
practice. 
4. Discussion of examples 
In what follows we will revisit two examples of naturally occurring conflictual 
data from Locher (2004) that were previously discussed in relation to the 
exercise of power and its potential co-occurrence with politeness 
manifestations. In the following analysis, however, the emphasis is placed on 
the breaking of norms of a practice and the emotional reactions this triggers. 
Methodologically, we identify such instances in the meta-comments made by 
the participants themselves as well as their explicit display of emotion through 
tone of voice. In doing so, we wish to demonstrate the link between the 
cognitive and emotional dimension of violating discursive expectations. The 
first example is taken from a dinner among family and friends, while the 
second example stems from a publicly broadcasted radio interview of 
President Clinton and Amy Goodman. In the third example, we will reflect on 
the use of emotionally charged verbs in a number of email service agreements 
found on the World Wide Web, which open a window into the explicit 
articulation of norms of emotional conduct.  
                     
12  The study of the connection of language and emotion is not new to linguistics (e.g. Bamberg, 
1997; Niemeyer & Dirven, 1997; Metts & Planalp, 2002), but fairly new to the field of 
im/politeness research. 
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4.1 Fending off lasting damage: Insecurity about the seriousness of 
 face-threatening acts 
'The Argument' is a sequence of 14 minutes during a dinner conversation 
among family and friends taped by one of the authors (Locher) in the late 
1990s in Philadelphia, USA. There are seven people around the dining table:  
Anne (host):   40 years old, married to John, designer 
John (host):   44 years old, married to Anne, Roy is his cousin, engineer 
Debbie (host):  15 years old, John and Anne's daughter 
Roy (guest):   64 years old, university professor 
Kate (guest):   62 years old, his wife, musician 
Steven (guest):  39 years old, an MD, Kate is his aunt 
Miriam (guest):  25 years old, friend with everyone, linguist 
The topic of the sequence entitled 'The Argument' concerns the high tuition 
fees of some US universities. Positions pro (Roy) and contra (Steven, Kate, 
Miriam, Anne) such fees are taken up by the participants (Debbie's and John's 
positions do not become clear). A more heated phase within 'The Argument' 
starts when Roy reports a study on twins in which earning power was 
compared. Roy and Steven are the main contributors during this episode. Roy 
presents this study in such a way that a heated argument occurs about its 
validity and results. Roy also particularly chooses to address Steven as his 
main contender and commits several face-threatening acts towards him (for 
example, claiming that Steven is prejudiced). In Locher (2004) I studied how 
the interactants express their agreement and disagreement and exercise 
power over each other. What we want to focus on here are Kate's comments 
on this episode, which occurred at a later stage during the dinner (cf. Locher, 
2004: 203-206): 
(1) Reflections on "The Argument" (Locher, 2004: 204) 
1 Anne: ^no I will not touch ^anything. ((REFERENCE TO DOING THE DISHES)) 
2   I 'want to enjoy your ^company. 
3   ^please don't give me a hard 'time, 
4   and [stay as <X XX X>.] 
5 Kate:  [you've ^you've enjoyed] ^fights, ((ADDRESSES MIRIAM)) 
6   .. you've enjoyed, 
7   .. ^boy you've got your 'dose tonight. ((REF. TO RECORDING)) 
8   .. we we 'apologize Steven. 
9 ....    ((LONG PAUSE)) 
10 Kate: wha-  
11   the - 
12   that was the the -- 
13 Steven: for what? 
14 Kate: ^well you-- 
15   .. look at the ^horns, 
16   and ^his 'horns, 
17   you ^locked, 
18   .. it was 'very ^dramatic. 
19 Steven: uh it was a lot of fun. 
20 Kate:  'two ^males, 
21   ^kind of fun isn't it? 
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22 ....   ((LONG PAUSE)) 
23 Roy: grrr. ((GROWLING LIKE A DOG)) 
24 Kate:  and I don't [see any] any horns on the ground. 
25 Miriam:                          [@@] 
26 Kate: you know, 
27   there is no -- 
28   there is no ^disaster. 
29   I watch the ^animals on the discovery channel, 
30   and I get such a ^kick out of it. 
31 Steven: so does my ^cat. 
In Locher (2004) I describe that I had felt insecure about the seriousness of 
the committed face-threatening acts during 'The Argument' – a fact that I did 
not explicitly comment on during the interaction13. However, that the episode 
was marked within the overall sociable and enjoyable evening was explicitly 
confirmed by Kate (l.5-8), who refers to my taping the event when she 
mentions "fights", claims that "^boy you've got your 'dose tonight" and then 
apologizes to Steven. Interestingly enough Kate apologizes although it was 
her husband, who was the main antagonist (l.8). I argued that this constitutes 
marked relational work since the apology comes much later in the evening, 
when 'The Argument' itself has faded in the background and thus gives it 
center stage once more, and since Kate includes her husband in this act. In 
other words, we witness an attempt at making sure that the good social 
relations between the participants are reinstituted before the party breaks up. 
In the continuation of the example, Steven is reluctant to refer back to 'The 
Argument' as problematic by not taking up the apology at first (l.9) and then 
asking 'for what' (l.13). Finally, he 'reframes' the episode as 'a lot of fun' (l.19). 
Roy seems to confirm this when he takes up Kate's analogy to the animal 
kingdom and 'growls' at Steven in a humorous way (l.23). This jocular analogy 
is interesting in itself because it tries to capture a transgression of emotional 
display during the argument. The metaphorical allusion to 'his horns' and the 
animalistic growling in reaction can thus be read as after-the-fact meta-
comments on emotional display: 'for a short time we behaved beyond the 
norm of appropriate emotional expression; we were too aggressive; a bit like 
ferocious animals'.  
With respect to emotions we have evidence that Kate perceived 'The 
Argument' as problematic as shown in her subsequent meta-comments in 
extract (1). Her attempt at ensuring a balance in the social ties between the 
protagonists, points to the breaking of a comfort zone with respect to the 
norms of this social practice of family and friends. Kate's interpretation was 
shared by me when experiencing 'The Argument', and also by Anne, who had 
                     
13  We would like to point out that this is one of the cases where discourse-analytical methods, 
which focus on the displayed signals only, fall short of accounting for internal cognitive and 
emotion states of interactors because they were not displayed by the participant. 
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engaged in acts of face-repair during 'The Argument', while Steven and Roy 
engaged with gusto in their verbal competition. 
4.2 Irritation and anger in a political interview 
The second example, also discussed in detail in Locher (2004), is taken from 
a radio interview that President Clinton gave to Amy Goodman of the 
broadcast 'Democracy Now!' on Radio Pacifica in 2000. The interview is of 
interest in so far as President Clinton lost his temper during the broadcast and 
displayed irritation and anger in his meta-comments and tone of voice. He had 
called the critical and independent radio station himself to encourage the 
listeners to go and vote as it was the day of the presidential election 
(November 7). While President Clinton had intended to spend a mere two 
minutes on the show, he found himself in the midst of a political interview of 30 
minutes when Amy Goodman and the co-host Gonzalo Aburto kept 
addressing critical and challenging questions to the parting president 
(Democracy Now! 2000). These questions14 were placed in such a way during 
the interview that President Clinton could not terminate the phone-call without 
giving the impression of dodging the questions – an impression he tried to 
avoid since the purpose of the call was to persuade the radio audience to go 
and cast their votes for the candidates of the Democrats15. While he was well-
inclined to answer initially, he became more and more irritated during the 
interview, since, in an enormous tour de force, the topics raised ranged from 
the role of corporations in politics, Leonard Peltier, the death penalty, Latino 
interests, Puerto Rico, undocumented workers ('trabajadores 
indocumentados'), Iraq, Cuba, China, Israel, Palestine, whether Ralph Nader 
had had an influence on the Democrats having swerved to the political right 
and the highest population of prisoners in the industrialized world to racial 
profiling. Extract (2) occurs towards the end of the interview when President 
Clinton answered a question on whether he had taken his party to the political 
right. He responded by asking "What is the measure of taking the Democratic 
Party to the right?" and then enlisted a number of points on which the Clinton 
administration had been successful.  
                     
14  Here the term 'questions' does not only refer to 'questions' making use of the typical syntactic 
form of a question, but also to the first pair part of an adjacency pair which invited President 
Clinton to respond (cf. Heritage & Greatbatch, 1991: 98). While Goodman uses syntactic 
questions, she also makes use of statements of a challenging nature to engage President 
Clinton. 
15  The candidates were Al Gore for President, Joe Liebermann for Vice-President and Hillary 
Clinton for Senator of New York. 
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(2) Clinton's annoyed comments on violated expectations (Locher, 2004: 298-299) 
1 Clinton:   ((CONT.))  
2  that the ^schools in this country that the ^test scores among-- 
3  since 'we have required ^all the schools to have basic=  
4  =^standards, 
5  ^test scores among ^African Americans and other minorities=  
6  =have ^gone ^up ^steadily?  
7 Goodman:  <A can I say what [^some people--A>] 
8 Clinton:             *[<A now what] now 'let me just finish. A> 
9 Goodman:  <A ^let me just [[say-- A>]] *((ANNOYED)) 
10 Clinton:     [[<A now ^let me--A>]] 
11  <A now ^wait a minute ^you ^started this and ^every question=  
12  =you've 'asked has been ^hostile and ^combative so ^you= 
13  ='listen to my ^answer will you ^do that? A> ((C. VERY ANNOYED)) 
14 Goodman:  they've been  [^critical.]  
15 Clinton:   [now now ^you] just ^listen to me.  
16  ^you ask the question and I'm going to ^answer. 
17  .. you have 'asked, 
18  ^questions in a ^hostile ^combative and even ^disrespectful  
19  =tone but I-- 
20  and you have ^never been able to combat the ^facts I have=  
21  =given you now you ^listen to this.  
22  the ^other thing Ralph Nader says is that,   ((END)) 
23  you know ^he's pure as Caesar's, 
24  ^wife on the environment. ((CONT.)) 
Goodman interrupts President Clinton's list in line 7, which is immediately 
reacted to in an irritated tone of voice. By line 10, President Clinton has won 
the fight for the floor and vents his irritation by stepping out of the interview 
frame and turning to aggressive meta-comments on the interviewing 
experience. His comments demonstrate that his expectations about how such 
a phone interview should evolve have been violated. He claims that it was 
Goodman who called up the interview frame ('you started this', l.11) and 
reproaches her of asking in a 'hostile', 'combative' and 'even disrespectful 
tone' (l.12, 18-19). President Clinton even gives a blueprint of how he 
interprets the situation: 'you ask the question and I'm going to ^answer' (l.16). 
He constructs Goodman's rights and obligations as follows: She has the right 
to ask questions, but the duties to do this in a respectful way and to listen to 
the answers without interrupting. President Clinton then continues answering 
and the interview finishes shortly after.  
This interview is exceptional since its frame was not pre-determined. Instead, 
it was originally triggered by an unannounced call from the President to the 
radio station. We have evidence in President Clinton's reaction, though, that 
he likened what evolved to a political interview in which certain rights and 
obligations are traditionally given to the interviewer and the interviewee (cf. 
e.g. Clayman & Heritage, 2002a; Greatbatch, 1988, 1992; Heritage & 
Greatbatch, 1991; Jucker, 1986, 2005; Locher & Watts, 2008; Thornborrow, 
2001). As just outlined, President Clinton explicitly lists these rights and 
obligations and at the same time complains that the interviewers have not 
granted him his rights. He seems to interpret this as an attack on his person 
Miriam A. LOCHER & Andreas LANGLOTZ 183 
 
and reacts negatively in an emotional way. The example thus nicely illustrates 
how face challenging acts are coupled with strong emotional reactions. 
According to Clinton's interpretation, this particular interview is deviating from 
the norm, which threatens his freedom of expression and challenges his self-
image. His evaluative reaction to this unfavorable context is therefore driven 
by a direct and spontaneous display of emotion: he is annoyed, angry, and 
becomes aggressive himself. Emotional display thus provides a powerful 
scaffolding to managing, negotiating, and protecting his face at a stage where 
the practice escalates, at least in his eyes.  
Interestingly, Amy Goodman also seems to orient herself to the interview 
frame, since she keeps asking questions in order to make the most of the 
President's phone call for her audience. However, she argues that her 
questions were 'critical' (l.14) rather than 'disrespectful'. We thus see two 
points of view on the same relational work, with Goodman having the greater 
tolerance for adversarialness16. In fact, she might consider it her obligation as 
a journalist at Radio Pacifica towards her audience to be as critical as she is. 
To echo Damasio's quotation above, Clinton's associations with 'well-being' in 
the interview are different and therefore lead to a discrepant emotional 
evaluation. 
4.3 Codes of conduct on email service agreements 
To complement these interactions based analyses, we will reflect on the use 
of emotionally charged verbs in a number of email service agreements found 
on the World Wide Web. These Netiquette statements address norms of 
emotional display explicitly and thus represent an attempt at institutionalizing 
frames of conduct. Therefore, they make it possible to gain direct insight into 
the assumed link between emotion, cognition, and relational work.   
Email received much attention in the early stages of CMC research and many 
manuals on proper writing were published (cf. e.g. Crystal, 2006, Ch. 4). Some 
of these texts claim that taboo language should be avoided and there are in 
fact email programs that 'warn' writers when they want to send off messages 
that contain taboo language (e.g. Eudora). This triggered the question whether 
email services mention taboo language nowadays in their service agreements. 
To study this, we will look at four email service providers. 
With respect to swearwords, Jay & Janschewitz (2008: 269) point out that 
"[f]rom what we have observed, we argue that swearing can be polite, 
                     
16  Clayman & Heritage (2002b) point out that adversarial questions directed at Presidents are 
nowadays quite common and that the overall level of deference and respect towards the 
Presidency has decreased over time. 
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impolite, or neither and it may be used with any emotional state." They 
especially stress the emotional aspect of using swearwords: 
Swearing is the use of taboo language with the purpose of expressing the speaker's 
emotional state and communicating that information to listeners […]. In contrast to most 
other speech, swearing is primarily meant to convey connotative or emotional meaning; 
the meanings of the words themselves are primarily construed as connotative […]. (Jay & 
Janschewitz, 2008: 268) 
Expressing emotions openly and using taboo language on the Internet can be 
interpreted as an inappropriate use of language in some practices, as such 
usage might threaten the social balance of the interaction, while it may be the 
norm and expected in others. Many manuals on online interaction advise 
against using 'flaming' and 'impolite language' to avoid misunderstandings and 
being disrespectful towards the often unknown addressees (Graham, 2008: 
287). However, in the general agreements on a code of conduct found when 
one signs up for an email service, four of the popular email providers, Hotmail, 
Gmail, Yahoo!, and Lycos17, are rather vague and general in the description of 
language usage18. This is not surprising since these rules are designed to 
apply to email interaction at the most general level and to include all kinds of 
communities of users (rather than being the negotiated result of those 
communities). Nevertheless they provide interesting data because the 
presumed link between norm and emotion is explicitly articulated. For 
example, Hotmail has the following to say with respect to proper conduct in its 
code of behavior in the section on prohibited use:  
(3) Hotmail's code of conduct 
You will not upload, post, transmit, transfer, distribute or facilitate distribution of any content 
(including text, images, sound, video, data, information or software) or otherwise use the service in a 
way that: 
- […] 
- incites, advocates, or expresses pornography, obscenity, vulgarity, profanity, hatred, bigotry, 
racism, or gratuitous violence. 
- […] 
- threatens, stalks, defames, defrauds, degrades, victimizes or intimidates an individual or 
group of individuals for any reason; including on the basis of age, gender, disability, ethnicity, sexual 
orientation, race or religion; or incites or encourages anyone else to do so. 
- […] 
                     
17  Hotmail: Microsoft Service Agreement, http://help.live.com/help.aspx?project=tou&mkt=en-us; 
 Gmail Program policies, section on 'Prohibited actions': 
   http://mail.google.com/mail/help/intl/en/program_policies.html 
 Yahoo!: Terms of Service, section on 'Member conduct':  
   http://info.yahoo.com/legal/us/yahoo/utos/utos-173.html 
 Lycos Mail Terms of Service, section on 'Member and User Conduct': 
   http://info.lycos.com/tos-mail.php 
18  My thanks for the idea to compare these sites go to Christine Tobisch, who wrote a seminar 
paper on Netiquette in 2008 at the University of Berne. 
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As we can see, these guidelines are not restricted to text alone, but include 
other modes of communication as well. Taboo language per se is not 
mentioned but the reader is left to imagine that some of the topics raised could 
be expressed by means of taboo language. In other words the terms of 
agreement refer to the content of a message rather than to its linguistic 
realization. The same observation is also valid for Gmail, Yahoo! and Lycos:  
(4) Gmail Program policies, section on 'Prohibited actions' 
In addition to (and/or as some examples of) the violations described in Section 3 of the Terms of 
Use, users may not:  
 […] 
 Send, upload, distribute or disseminate or offer to do the same with respect to any unlawful, 
defamatory, harassing, abusive, fraudulent, infringing, obscene, or otherwise objectionable 
content  
(5) Yahoo!: Terms of Service, section on 'Member conduct':   
You agree to not use the Service to: 
a. upload, post, email, transmit or otherwise make available any Content that is unlawful, harmful, 
threatening, abusive, harassing, tortious, defamatory, vulgar, obscene, libelous, invasive of 
another's privacy, hateful, or racially, ethnically or otherwise objectionable; 
(6) Lycos Mail Terms of Service, section on 'Member and User Conduct':  
In addition to the Prohibited Conduct listed in Section 6 of the General Terms and Conditions, you 
agree that you will not use the Service to  
[…] 
3b.  Send, upload, distribute or disseminate or offer to do the same with respect to any unlawful, 
defamatory, harassing, abusive, fraudulent, infringing, obscene, or otherwise objectionable 
content 
The degree to which the chosen words are charged with negative emotions is 
immediately striking. Serious face-threatening acts are committed when one 
interactant "threatens, stalks, defames, defrauds, degrades, victimizes or 
intimidates" another person. These acts clearly threaten the social balance 
and attack a person's identity to a large extent. The fact that these issues 
have to be put down in writing points to their potential occurrence, though, and 
warns new users of the service about being careful to respect the rights of 
other members, if they wish to avoid evoking the negative evaluations 
triggered by the offences. In other words, they are warnings against breaking 
emotional display rules. Indeed the game of trolling, i.e., the conscious and 
intentional act of starting an online conflict – also known as a flame war (cf. 
Wood & Smith, 2005: 135) –, has the one and only purpose of triggering very 
strong and aggressive emotional reactions in the attacked victims. Flame wars 
therefore constitute a perfect example of the strategic violation of emotional 
display rules and their close association with expectations of appropriate 
behavior, in this case Netiquette (cf. Baker, 2001; Du Val Smith, 1999; Reid, 
1999).  
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What is also striking is the similarity of the vocabulary employed in the codes 
of conduct of the four email services. In fact, if you google the Yahoo! 
paragraph quoted above in string form (33 words), you get 159,000 hits alone, 
which points to the fact that this wording is routinely used in legal texts on 
service agreements. We are of course dealing with legal reminders here rather 
than with member's compilations of codes of conduct usually associated with 
Netiquettes of particular practices per se. It would be of interest to see 
whether the Netiquettes of mailing lists, in which groups of people negotiate 
norms of conduct create their own wording or whether they also rely on each 
others' phrasing of rules to a large extent. Thus, with reference to our previous 
examples, it would be fruitful to study how online communities refer to and 
negotiate such rules of conduct in actual CMC interactions. We can easily find 
both instances of meta-comments on relational work given by the interactants 
themselves by doing lexical searches for judgments (e.g. 'polite', 'rude', 
'impolite') and we can study how practices emerge and how norms are 
negotiated (cf. e.g. Graham, 2007, 2008 on the emergence and negotiation of 
norms in a mailing list). Computer-mediated communication (CMC) thus 
constitutes a fascinating area for researchers interested in interpersonal 
pragmatics (cf. Locher, under review, on the negotiation of conflict on a 
message board). 
5. Conclusion and further research 
The selection of examples discussed was not chosen with the intent of 
claiming that emotions occur in naturally occurring interaction – this would be 
too obvious a point. What we hope to have shown, however, is that emotions 
play a role in judgments on relational work and how we can tie this finding in 
with the existing literature from politeness research. In other words, if we 
speak of perceptions and judgments on behavior in relation to the norms 
inherent in a particular social practice, it is significant to realize that it is the 
individuals who claim these rights and obligations in analogy to their past 
experiences. These interactants tie these rights and obligations to their own 
person, i.e. to their face and identity, which makes them vulnerable. While 
many interactants will neither comment on their emotions directly nor 
immediately reference relational work with labels such as 'refined', 'rude' or 
'disrespectful', sometimes we get the chance to witness interactants 
expressing their emotions and their judgments on relational work explicitly in 
meta-comments on interaction. We argue that these comments can function 
like windows into the fabric of social norms, so that researchers can get a 
glimpse at what people construct as breakings of frames. We suggest that this 
is taken as a starting point to further explore the interface of relational work 
and emotion with regard to the following theoretical and methodological 
issues: 
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 What forms of emotional display are there in language and interaction? 
 What is emotional meaning? Is emotional display always coupled with 
relational meaning? 
 Where and when does emotional display occur in discourse and when 
and why is there no explicit display of emotions? 
 What challenges does this create for discourse analytical methodology? 
 Is it necessary to integrate discursive approaches with psychological 
paradigms? 
Despite the fact that this paper has maybe raised more questions than it has 
answered, we hope to have demonstrated that the discursive approach to 
politeness, which can be enlarged to the study of relational work in general, 
will also have to tackle questions pertaining to emotions and that the interface 
of the study of cognition, interaction and emotion still holds many exciting 
questions for us to answer in the future.  
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Appendix 
Transcription conventions 
The following conventions have been adapted from Du Bois et al. (1992):  
.,? A period is used to indicate a falling intonation with a conclusion point; a comma 
expresses a continuing intonation; a question mark indicates a high rising terminal. 
^word A caret marks a word which carries the primary accent in an intonation unit. 
'word    A raised stroke indicates a minor or secondary accent. 
=    In order to show lengthening of sounds, an equals sign is used. Alternatively it is 
used to indicate run-on lines (see illustration below). 
-    A single hyphen is used to indicate an unfinished word. 
--    Two hyphens show that a whole intonation unit was left unfinished. 
..    Two periods indicate a short pause (according to the author's judgment). 
...    Three periods or more are used to indicate a medium or very long pause. 
[word]    Square brackets indicate speech overlap. Double or triple square brackets are 
used to distinguish this overlap from previous ones. 
@    This symbol is used to represent laughter in syllables. 
X    The letter X is used to indicate either a speaker whose identity is unclear or an 
unintelligible syllable or word. 
*    An asterisk points to further background information given in double parentheses. 
The following combinations indicate that the words enclosed by the angle brackets have the quality of 
the additional symbol(s): 
<X ... X>   Utterances marked by this are unintelligible.  
<A ... A>   Allegro, rapid speech 
 ((GULP))   Double parentheses are used to accommodate the transcriber's comments. 
